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THE VALUE OF CREATIVE PROFESSIONALS IN
THE ENTERTAINMENT CAPITAL OF THE
WORLD: WHY "CELEBRITY GOODWILL"
SHOULD BE A DIVISIBLE COMMUNITY
PROPERTY INTEREST IN CALIFORNIA
DIVORCES
I. INTRODUCTION
Film director John McTiernan was recently involved in the high-
profile investigation by private investigator Anthony Pellicano, who is
charged with crimes including racketeering and wiretapping. 1  In
September 2007, a federal judge sentenced Mr. McTiernan to four months
in jail for lying to the FBI about hiring Pellicano to wiretap the telephone
of a film producer he was collaborating with at the time.2 However, this
was not Mr. McTiernan's first foray into a high-profile legal drama. His
divorce from second wife Donna Dubrow was, like many celebrity
divorces, highly publicized and full of scandal.3 For the legal world, the
most fascinating thing to come from this divorce case was its effect on the
divorces of celebrities and creative professionals in California,4 where
many celebrities have made their home.
in re Marriage of McTiernan5 was a monumental decision because it
was the first case to address the treatment of "celebrity goodwill" in
California divorces. Celebrity goodwill refers to the value of the "excess
earning capacity attributable to status as a celebrity." 6 Goodwill itself is an
1. Greg Krikorian, 2nd Prison Term in Pellicano Case, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2007, at B1.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Amanda Bronstad, In Splitsville, Reputation Comes With a Price: Director's Divorce
May Set Precedent on Issue, L.A. BUS. J., Nov. 14, 2005, at 8 (discussing the holding that
celebrity goodwill should be excluded from consideration in divorce proceedings).
5. In re Marriage of McTieman, 133 Cal. App. 4th 1090 (2005).
6. Jack A. Rounick & R. William Riggs, What's Perk-olating? How Courts are Handling
Perks, Fringe and Other Employment Benefits, 23 FAM. ADVOC. 12, 17 (2001).
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intangible asset,7 defined under California law as "the expectation of
continued public patronage" of a business 8 or a professional practice, 9 often
measured as "the advantage or benefit which is acquired by an
establishment beyond the mere value of the capital stock, funds or
property... [including] constant or habitual customers.., reputation for
skill or affluence, or punctuality."' 0 In divorce cases, the court must first
determine whether goodwill exists, and if it does, assign it a value and
include it in the community property that is divided equally between the
spouses at divorce." At the time of McTiernan, it was well established in
divorce proceedings that the goodwill of one spouse's professional practice
or business should be taken into consideration in determining the
community property award to the other spouse.'2  However, California
courts had never discussed this goodwill in the context of a celebrity or
other successful creative professional. 3  By holding that there was no
goodwill value in Mr. McTiernan's career as a motion picture director, the
court effectively proclaimed that "celebrity goodwill" did not exist in
California.'
4
The court's decision was based on its determination that goodwill can
only attach to a business that is a commercial or industrial enterprise with
assets, and since McTiernan's "elite professional standing" was not a
commercial enterprise with physical assets, he could not generate
goodwill.' 5  This narrow interpretation of California's goodwill law
effectively denied Ms. Dubrow the right to share in her husband's
increased earning capacity, which increased during their marriage from
$450,000 to $6 million per film.16 The court reached that decision despite
the fact that Ms. Dubrow left her career as a film executive to support Mr.
McTiernan's directing career and therefore, at the time of their divorce, had
no real earning capacity of her own. 17 California law designates that "if
7. Honey Kessler Amado, Should California Follow the Lead of Other States in Discarding
the Notion of Personal Goodwill as a Community Asset?, 28 L.A. LAW. 39, 39 (2005).
8. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14100 (West 1987).
9. Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 251 (1956).
10. In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 581-82 (1974).
11. In re Marriage of Watts, 171 Cal. App. 3d 366, 370 (1985).
12. Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d at 582.
13. Laurence J. Cutler & Robin C. Bogan, The Nature of the Beast: Celebrity Goodwill, 25
FAM. ADVOC. 20, 20 (2003).
14. McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1093.
15. McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1101.
16. Combined Respondent's Brief and Cross-Appellant's Opening Brief at 2, In re Marriage
of McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th 1090 (2005) (No. B 161255).
17. Id.
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goodwill exists at the time of divorce, some part of it must be attributable
to the resources the marriage put into its development. 1 8 According to the
court's construal of goodwill, if Mr. McTiernan had been a doctor, a
lawyer, an accountant, or any other professional working in an enterprise
with assets and earning a substantial income above that of his peers, his
wife would have been entitled to a portion of the increased earning capacity
accumulated during their marriage. 19 However, since Mr. McTiernan's
profession was based on his creative skill for directing movies and not on
the existence of a commercial enterprise, Ms. Dubrow was not entitled to
share in his increased earning capacity, no matter how much she sacrificed
to ensure its existence.
The McTiernan decision is out of line with California precedent and
results in unfair treatment of the spouses of celebrities and other creative
professionals. The court read the applicable California statutes 20 very
narrowly, straying from the natural evolution of California's goodwill law
up to that point. This Article explores the rationales behind the McTiernan
decision and forecasts the detrimental impact the case will have on future
California divorces if it is not re-evaluated.
Although "celebrity goodwill" is the term that has been coined for
this area of divorce law,21 McTiernan extends beyond celebrities. Consider
the following hypothetical situation: Henry and Wanda were a young
married couple living in Los Angeles when Wanda started to pursue her
career as an interior designer. Henry was supportive and worked overtime
in his job as a car salesman to support Wanda as she strove to establish her
career. Wanda went to networking events and did everything she could to
get her name out. Her efforts were successful and soon she was making a
healthy income designing the homes of the rich and famous. Her services
were in high demand and she worked so much that Henry quit his own job
to help manage the couple's home and finances. However, Wanda's long
hours and lifestyle of associating with the rich and famous eventually took
their toll on the marriage. Eight years into her career and ten years into
their marriage, Wanda filed for divorce. At the time, she earned an average
income of $750,000 per year for her services and had a steady and growing
clientele, based on her reputation as one of the best interior designers in
Los Angeles. Since she worked from home, she had no office, no
18. Catherine T. Smith, Professional Goodwill: Two Community Property States Differ on
Its Characterization and Division, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 246, 249 (1997).
19. McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1112.
20. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 14100, 14102 (West 1987).
21. See Rounick & Riggs, supra note 6, at 17 (using the term "celebrity goodwill"
exclusively in the celebrity context).
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commercial location, and no employees.
Throughout this Article, McTiernan will be applied to the above
hypothetical to illustrate the wide-reaching impact the court's decision will
have on divorces involving celebrities, as well as other creative
professionals whose careers fall outside of the traditional business
structure.
II. THE MCTIERNAN DECISION
The California Court of Appeal decided In re Marriage of McTiernan
in 2005.22 The proceeding involved the divorce of Donna Dubrow and
John McTiernan, the film director best known for his work on films such as
"Die Hard" and "The Thomas Crown Affair."2 3 Mr. McTiernan appealed
the trial court's finding that his profession as a film director included
goodwill, and since goodwill was community property, it was part of the
assets to be divided with his wife upon divorce. 24 Evidence introduced at
trial showed that "during and after the marriage and to some extent before,
[Mr. McTiernan] was a very successful motion picture director," 25 and the
trial court acknowledged that he had become a man with "an enormous
earning capacity. ' 26  During the nine-year marriage, Mr. McTieman's
earnings increased from $450,000 per film to $6 million per film.2 7 By the
time the proceeding went to trial, his earnings were up to $8.5 million per
film. 8 As for Ms. Dubrow, prior to marrying Mr. McTiernan she was
earning a yearly salary of $195,000 at a production company. 29 After
marrying him, she left her job so she could devote herself to supporting his
directing career, and also became his producing partner.30 At the time of
the divorce trial, the court deemed her earning capacity "almost non-
existent."
31
The trial court relied on the California Business & Professions Code,
which provides that "[t]he 'good will' of a business is the expectation of
22. In re Marriage of McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th 1090, 1090 (2005).
23. Id. at 1094.
24. Id. at 1093.
25. Id. at 1094.
26. Combined Respondent's Brief and Cross-Appellant's Opening Brief,
supra note 16, at 1.
27. Id. at 2.
28. Id. at 5.
29. McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1094.
30. Combined Respondent's Brief and Cross-Appellant's Opening Brief,
supra note 16, at 5.
31. Id. at 1.
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,,32
continued public patronage, and "[t]he good will of a business is
property and is transferable., 33 However, the court of appeal stated that
whether McTieman's profession as a film director included goodwill
required determining the meaning of "a business" in the goodwill statute.
34
The court acknowledged two possible definitions.35  First was the
possibility that the term includes "a person doing business," the definition
the trial court adopted.36  The second possible definition was "a
professional, commercial or industrial enterprise with assets. 37 The court
of appeal adopted the second definition,38 thereby reversing the trial court's
judgment and holding that McTieman's profession as a film director
contained no goodwill.39 In support of its adopted definition, the court
provided three rationales.4 °
A. The Historical Understanding of Goodwill
First, the McTiernan court found that the chosen definition conformed
to "the historical understanding of goodwill," which it understood as
incident only to an existing business, and not separable from the physical
assets of that business. 41  The court further supported the historical
foundations by asserting that "[n]o California case has held that a natural
person, apart and distinct from a 'business,' can create or generate
goodwill. 42
B. The Interpretation of California's Goodwill Statutes
The second rationale used by the court was that under the plain
meaning of the goodwill statutes, only a business, and not a person, is
capable of generating goodwill.43 Asserting that "[t]here is no doubt about
the 'ordinary, everyday meaning' of the term 'a business,"' the court said
that a business is "a professional, commercial or industrial enterprise with
32. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14100 (West 1987).
33. Id. § 14102.
34. McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1096.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1102.
40. McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1096.
41. In re Marriage of McTieman, 133 Cal. App. 4th 1090, 1096-97 (2005).
42. Id. at 1098 (emphasis added).
43. In re Marriage of McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th 1090, 1096 (2005).
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assets," and claimed that "[i]t is also clear that 'a business' is not a natural
person."4 The court also found that to read "a person doing business" into
the language of the statute would effectively amend the statute and enlarge
its scope "beyond the traditional understanding of goodwill., 45 The court
explained this would have wide ramifications; namely, that all natural
persons doing business would possess goodwill, which would "create a
substantial liability ... without a guaranty that the liability would be
funded.
4 6
C. Ensuring that Goodwill is Considered "Property"
Finally, the court believed that to restrict the definition of "a
business" to a commercial enterprise would ensure that the goodwill was
considered "property" for community property purposes.4 7 Noting that for
goodwill to be "divisible as community property, it must be, in the first
place, property," and that transferability is an essential element of property,
the court concluded that since Mr. McTiernan's reputation as a director
could not be sold or transferred, his reputation could not properly fall
within the statute as "property.,
48
III. REFUTING THE RATIONALES OF MCTIERNAN
A. The Historical Understanding of "a Business" Includes a Person
Doing Business
In support of its first rationale that its definition of "a business"
conforms to California's historical understanding of the term, the
McTiernan court referenced a body of case law from the late Nineteenth
and early Twentieth centuries. 49 The court discussed a Supreme Court case
from 1893, which held that goodwill is "tangible only as an incident, as
connected with a going concern or business having locality or name, and is
not susceptible of being disposed of independently." 50  Another case
44. Id. at 1098.
45. Id. at 1099.
46. Id.
47. In re Marriage of McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th 1090, 1100 (2005).
48. Id. at 1100-01.
49. In re Marriage of McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th 1090, 1097 (2005).
50. See Metro. Nat'l Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U.S. 436, 446 (1893) (holding that
when a newspaper whose plant and goodwill was mortgaged is consolidated with another
newspaper which uses up the mortgaged plant in the course of business, the lien of the mortgage
does not apply to the existing plant or the goodwill).
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discussed by the McTiernan court was from 1882.51 In that case, the court
refused to attach goodwill to shares of stock, claiming that it did not make
sense to extend goodwill value to something intangible which exists "only
in contemplation of law."
52
After outlining the rules from these turn-of-the-century cases, the
McTiernan court stated that, with regard to the definition of goodwill,
"nothing had changed since these early cases were decided," and that "[n]o
California case has held that a natural person, apart and distinct from a
'business,' can generate goodwill., 53 Regarding California's "professional
goodwill" cases, which have found goodwill in professional practices based
on an individual's personal skill and reputation, the court said that "[i]t is
the business, i.e., the practice, that generates goodwill, even if the practice
is conducted by a sole practitioner.,
54
The cases following these early decisions have actually developed a
broader understanding of goodwill than the McTiernan court suggested.
Although no court has specifically held that a natural person can generate
goodwill, courts have found that a commercial enterprise is not a
requirement for goodwill: an individual person practicing a profession and
generating income from the profession can generate goodwill. For
example, in Mueller v. Mueller, a court of appeal recognized that a business
dependent entirely on the skill of one person, and not just a commercial
enterprise, could contain transferable goodwill.55  In that divorce
proceeding, the husband appealed the trial court's finding that his dental
laboratory was community property and that its value included $25,000 in
goodwill.56 The appellate court disagreed with Mr. Mueller's argument
that no goodwill attaches to a business that is dependent "solely on [the
business owner's] personal skill and ability., 57  The court held that
goodwill not only exists in commercial or trade enterprises, but "also exists
in a professional practice or in a business which is founded upon personal
skill or reputation., 58 The court explained that when a person acquires a
reputation for skill in a certain profession, "he often creates an intangible
but valuable property by winning the confidence of his patrons and
51. Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler, 62 Cal. 69, 69 (1882).
52. Id. at 118 (affirming the action of the Board of Equalization in raising the assessment of
the Spring Valley Water Works franchise from $5,000 to $5 million).
53. McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1098.
54. Id. at 1098 (citing Golden v. Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 405 (1969); Todd v. Todd,
272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 792 (1969)).
55. Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 251 (1956).
56. Id. at 250.
57. Id. at 251.
58. Id. at 250-51 (emphasis added).
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securing immunity from successful competition. 59
According to the MeTiernan court's construction, Mueller would not
stand for the principle that goodwill can attach to a professional because
"[i]t is the business, i.e., the practice, that generates goodwill., 60 Although
Mueller clearly held that a commercial enterprise is not a requirement for
goodwill to be considered property, the husband's dental laboratory did
resemble a commercial enterprise with assets and therefore can be aligned
with the McTiernan understanding of goodwill. However, this fact does
not take away from the basic holding in Mueller, which clearly intended to
remove the commercial enterprise constraint on goodwill and to establish
that the skill or reputation of a person can generate goodwill. The court
specifically disagreed with the old understanding of goodwill as existing
"only in commercial or trade enterprises" and found that goodwill could
also exist in "a professional practice or in a business which is founded upon
personal skill or reputation.",6' Thus, goodwill does not require physical
assets of a commercial enterprise, but can also attach when the "asset" is
intangible, such as personal skill or reputation. Cases since Mueller have
substantiated this view, finding goodwill to attach to a "business" which
was less of a commercial enterprise with physical assets and more of a
natural person with special skills.62
In Justice Cooper's dissent in McTiernan, he pointed to some
California cases that support the idea that an individual, outside of a
traditional business with physical assets, can generate goodwill based on
his or her personal skill or reputation.63 First, in Marriage of King, one
court of appeal found goodwill in a husband's solo practice as a computer
consultant.64 The difference between the business valued in King and the
one in Mueller was that in King, the "husband had no plant, no commercial
location, no employees, and did not maintain an office., 65 King refutes the
MeTiernan assertion that "a business" must be an enterprise with tangible
assets or an "entity other than a natural person" under California law.66
After all, in King, goodwill was based on Mr. King's increased earning
capacity as a "recognized authority" in his field.67  It is true that, in a
59. Id. at 251.
60. McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1098.
6 1. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d at 251 (emphasis added).
62. See, e.g., In re Marriage of King, 150 Cal. App. 3d 304 (1983).
63. McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1116-17 (2005) (Cooper, J., dissenting).
64. King, 150 Cal. App. 3d at 304.
65. Id. at 310.
66. McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1098.
67. King, 150 Cal. App. 3d at 308.
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footnote, the court stated that in "a different factual situation... goodwill
may be reliant on factors other than the owner., 68  However, King
recognized that the absence of features of a traditional business entity
would "weigh in the total assessment of goodwill valuation" and it still
found that goodwill existed.69 Therefore, under King, goodwill may attach
to "a business" whose only assets are the personal skill and reputation of its
owner.
Justice Cooper's dissent in McTiernan also pointed to the 2004
decision of In re Marriage of Iredale and Cates.70 In that case, the Court
of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision, rejecting the husband's
assertion that his wife's partnership in a major law firm included $330,000
worth of goodwill. 71 The court reasoned that because she had signed a
partnership agreement stating that she did not own any of the accounts
receivable, work in progress, or goodwill of the firm, her interest in the
firm could not include goodwill.72 However, the court also upheld the trial
court's determination that "Iredale herself possessed goodwill" and upheld
the trial court's valuation of that goodwill at $42,3 18.73  Since her
compensation as an attorney was slightly more than the average
compensation of other lawyers in similar firms in the same city, she had
goodwill that could be valued.74 The case indicates once again that finding
goodwill is not solely dependent upon the existence of a business in the
form of an enterprise with assets as McTiernan claims, but also can be
generated by a natural person who has enhanced earning capacity as a
result of his or her skill in a field.
The opinions above demonstrate that the definition of goodwill has
been read more broadly than the McTiernan court believed and has been
expanded to include a person doing business. The understanding of
goodwill has evolved beyond the early cases that the McTiernan court
relied on, and in asserting that California has not recognized goodwill
generated by a person, the court ignores this evolution.75 Mueller laid the
groundwork for allowing a natural person to generate goodwill, and, since
then, California courts have consistently assigned goodwill value based on
68. Id. at 31 On.1.
69. Id. at 310.
70. McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1115-16 (Cooper, J., dissenting) (citing In re Marriage
of Iredale and Cates, 121 Cal. App. 4th 321 (2004)).
71. Id. at 328-29.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 329 (emphasis added).
74. Id.
75. McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1098 (citing In re Marriage of Lopez, 38 Cal. App. 3d.
93 (1974)); Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d at 401.
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an individual's personal skill and reputation.76 Justice Cooper put it best in
his dissenting opinion in McTiernan by stating that "[a]ny professional who
independently practices his or her profession ... thereby conducts a
business, within the lead opinion's own unattributed definition, as well as
more traditional ones.",
7
7
Mr. McTieman's "business" may not have had the commercial
element or physical assets that the majority thought to be necessary for
finding goodwill, but he did have an impressive reputation in the film-
making industry, which enabled him to earn far more than the average film
director.78 At trial, executives from two film studios testified that they
were working on projects with him and a third studio had just entered a
deal with him.79 It is apparent that he had an established customer base in
the studios, but under the McTiernan ruling, this would be considered
goodwill only if he also ran a commercial enterprise with tangible assets.
However, because his career was founded on skill, and was not a
commercial establishment with physical assets, the court held that he was
not able to generate the "expectation of continued public patronage"
required by statute.8°
Applying the McTiernan rule to the hypothetical, Wanda would also
be denied the valuable property interest of goodwill. This is because she
does not have the physical assets of a commercial enterprise, even though
she does have an established reputation as an interior designer and her
services are in high demand. Because her career would not be assigned
goodwill value, she would walk away from the marriage with an increased
earning capacity generated during her marriage to Henry. However, Henry
would leave the marriage without a share of that earning capacity, even
though he contributed to it by sacrificing his own career to support
Wanda's.
The result under McTiernan's ruling is an anomaly because under the
correct historical understanding and evolution of goodwill in California,
both Mr. McTiernan and Wanda should be deemed to have goodwill based
on their reputation and skill as creative professionals. 81 Neither individual
may have physical assets or a commercial establishment, but they both
76. See, e.g., King, 150 Cal. App. 3d at 308-10; Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d at 404-05.
77. McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1116-17.
78. Id. at 1094.
79. Combined Respondent's Brief and Cross-Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 16, at
17.
80. McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1102 (citing CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 14100 (West
1987)).
81. See King, 150 Cal. App. 3d at 308-10; Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d at 404-05.
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have the asset of talent in their chosen fields. California recognizes that
talent, skill, and reputation are just as capable of generating goodwill as a
commercial enterprise.
82
B. California's Goodwill Statutes Can Be Interpreted to Include a Person
Doing Business
Principles of statutory interpretation underlie the McTiernan court's
second rationale for not assigning goodwill.8 3 Applying the first step of
statutory interpretation, the court looked to the actual language of the
statute. The court claimed that the term "a business" was not ambiguous or
uncertain, and there was "no doubt" that the ordinary meaning of the term
is "a professional, commercial or industrial enterprise with assets," and
"not a natural person." 84  Actual language controls when a term is
unambiguous; therefore, the court stopped interpreting the statute and
adopted this definition without citing to any authority in support.85 The
court defended its interpretation of the statute as though it were the only
possible definition for "a business," even though it had previously
recognized two possible definitions of the term in the goodwill context: "a
person doing business" or "a professional, commercial or industrial
enterprise with assets., 86 By the court's own admission, it is possible to
read "a person doing business" into the meaning of "a business," and thus
there is uncertainty or ambiguity as to the statutory meaning.
87
Other California cases have defined "a business" in an entirely
different way than McTiernan. For example, in determining whether the
city of Los Angeles could impose a license tax upon an attorney, the
California Supreme Court in Ex Parte Galusha, interpreted the phrase "any
lawful business or calling. 88  The Galusha court looked to the New
Standard Dictionary, which defined a business as "[a] pursuit or occupation
that employs or requires energy, time and thought; trade; profession;
calling." 89 The court reasoned that "these terms include those following the
professions as well as those engaged in work of a more purely commercial
nature." 90 This statement reflects the Galusha court's finding that the term
82. Id.
83. In re Marriage of McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th 1090, 1098 (2005).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1096.
87. Id.
88. Ex Parte Galusha, 184 Cal. 697, 700 (1921).
89. Id. at 701.
90. Id.
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"business" can include a professional person, and is not limited to a
commercial enterprise. The McTiernan court's conclusion that "a person
doing business" is not a "business,"9' is therefore not supported by
dictionaries92 or the California Supreme Court.9 3 Given the lack of support
for the McTiernan court's interpretation, and the Galusha court's contrary
interpretation, it is even more difficult to understand how the court in
McTiernan could proclaim that there is only one possible definition of "a
business."
Aside from looking at the actual language of the statute, the
McTiernan court said it would not read "a person doing business" into the
statute for fear of enlarging the statute's scope "beyond the traditional
understanding of goodwill" as being attributable only to a commercial
establishment.94  This assumes that the traditional understanding of
goodwill is the understanding that the McTiernan court adopts. As
previously indicated, however, courts have found goodwill in professionals
practicing outside of a commercial establishment, which indicates that the
traditional understanding of goodwill is not necessarily what the
McTiernan court claims.
In the case of In re Marriage of Foster,95 the court of appeal
expanded the definition of goodwill under the California statute.9 6 The
primary issue before the court in this divorce case was the proper method
of evaluating the goodwill of the husband's individual medical practice.
97
It was undisputed by the parties that the goodwill of his practice was
community property and thus subject to division at divorce.98 However,
the court still took the opportunity to clarify the meaning of goodwill under
the statute by providing a more complete definition of goodwill as:
the advantage or benefit which is acquired by an establishment
beyond the mere value of the capital stock, funds or property
employed therein, in consequence of the general public
patronage and encouragement which it receives from constant or
91. MeTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1099.
92. See, e.g., AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 4TH ED.,
available at http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/business (last visited Oct. 2, 2007) (defining
"business" as "[t]he occupation, work, or trade in which a person is engaged," or alternately as
"[a] specific occupation or pursuit").
93. Galusha, 184 Cal. at 701.
94. McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1099.
95. In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577 (1974).
96. See generally S. David Rosenson, Celebrity Goodwill-Is it Time?, 32 BEVERLY HILLS
BAR ASS'N J. 46 (1997).
97. Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d at 579-80.
98. Id.
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habitual customers, on account of its local position, or common
celebrity, or reputation for skill or affluence, or punctuality, or
from other accidental circumstances, or necessities, or even from
ancient partialities or prejudices. 99
Not only does Foster interpret the goodwill statute in an expansive
manner, but its expansion also indicates that an established enterprise with
physical assets is not a requirement for generating goodwill. The
McTiernan court expressed concern that if "a person doing business" is
read into the goodwill statute, goodwill would be solely reliant on earning
capacity, which would be problematic. 00 The court insisted that since an
individual's earnings are not predictable like the assets of "an established
business enterprise," the result will be that "a person would find him- or
herself saddled with a massive liability without the means of satisfying
it."'' However, a reading of the Foster definition of goodwill shows that
even in an "establishment," goodwill is nothing more than the vague idea
of an "advantage or benefit" that is derived from a consistent flow of
customers. 102 The Foster court specifically did not tie goodwill to anything
resembling hard assets like "capital stock, funds, or property."'' 0 3 Earnings
are no less predictable than the consistency of customers frequenting an
establishment, so allowing a person to generate goodwill based on their
earning capacity carries no particular risk of creating liabilities that cannot
be satisfied. Additionally, the court reasoned that basing goodwill on
excess earnings would require considering the "expectancy of future
earnings," to determine goodwill, which would violate California
community property law.104 This concern brings up more in-depth issues
of valuing goodwill, which have been resolved by California courts on
numerous occasions. 0 5 These valuation issues will be discussed in more
detail below. 1
06
The McTiernan court was afraid of expanding the statute beyond
some "traditional understanding" not followed by modern case law.
However, the court failed to realize that the narrow reading of the statute
99. Id. at 581-82 (citing In re Lyons, 27 Cal. App. 2d 293, 297-98 (1938)).
100. McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1099.
101. Id.
102. Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d at 581.
103. Id. at 582.
104. McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1099 n.7.
105. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Watts, 171 Cal. App. 3d 366 (1985); In re Marriage of
King, 150 Cal. App. 3d 304 (1983); In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577 (1974); In re
Marriage of Fortier, 34 Cal. App. 3d 384 (1973).
106. See infra Part IV.
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will have a significant impact on spouses of professionals with enhanced
earning capacity based on personal skill. Community property principles
dictate that the goodwill of one spouse's business or professional practice
created during marriage is attributable to the marriage and thus considered
community property and divided equally between the spouses.
10 7
However, under the McTiernan rule, Ms. Dubrow, who sacrificed her own
career to support her husband's and also to work alongside him as a
producing partner, was not allowed to share in his enhanced earning
capacity which was generated during marriage and clearly attributable in
part to her investment in his career.
Similarly, in the hypothetical, where Henry gave up his own career in
order to manage the family home so that Wanda could have more freedom
to develop her career in interior design, the McTiernan rule would prevent
him from sharing in her earning capacity, which is substantially higher than
that of her peers. These results are based on the court's fear of the
ramifications of reading "a person doing business" into the statute. These
fears are not only insignificant compared to the impact of the narrowly-read
statute, but they are also unnecessary given the nature of speculation in
valuing goodwill.
If the McTiernan court had continued its statutory interpretation
beyond the initial step of analyzing the plain meaning of the language, it
would likely have concluded that "a person doing business" can be read
into the statute. Consequently, Mr. McTieman's career as a film director
would be considered "a business" under California's goodwill statutes
because he conducted a business based on his personal skill and reputation.
In the hypothetical, Wanda would also have "a business" even though she
did not have a commercial enterprise with physical assets in the form of an
office or employees. Under the McTiernan rule, both Ms. Dubrow and
Henry are deprived of their fair share of the excess earning capacity that
their spouses' businesses generated, simply because the court looked no
further than what it thought to be the only possible meaning of the word
"business."
C Goodwill Is Still a Property Interest if it Includes Persons Doing
Business
The final rationale for the McTiernan court's narrow reading of the
statute was that limiting businesses to commercial enterprises ensures that
goodwill is considered "property" and subject to community property
107. See Smith, supra note 18, at 249 (stating that existing goodwill at time of divorce must
be attributable in some part to the efforts made by the marriage).
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divorce laws.108 The court acknowledged that "property" may be intangible
and may take the form of "a right rather than a physical object." 109
However, the court believed that "property" must be transferable, reasoning
that "[s]omething that cannot be transferred or sold has no value on the
market." 110 Because the goodwill assigned to Mr. McTieman by the trial
court ("earning capacity and reputation in his profession as a motion
picture director which greatly exceeds that of most persons involved in that
profession") could not be sold, it could not be considered property and
therefore could not truly be goodwill."1  Since the court reasoned that
goodwill generated by a person doing business was not transferable, this
type of goodwill would not conform to California's goodwill statute, which
states that "[t]he good will of a business is property and is transferable."
' 12
Goodwill may only attach to a "professional, commercial or industrial
enterprise."' 13
Case law dictates the opposite conclusion. 1 4 In Mueller, the court
indicated that when a person acquires a reputation or a skill in a certain
profession, that person can create an "intangible but valuable property by
winning the confidence of his patrons," and that it is well settled that this
property is transferable. 1 5 Thus, even if the goodwill is attached solely to
the skill of a natural person, it is still considered transferable. Additionally,
in Marriage of Watts, the court held that the husband's medical practice
was capable of having goodwill, even though the practice was not capable
of being sold. 16  The court held that "[i]n the dissolution of marriage
context, the mere fact that a professional practice cannot be sold, standing
alone, will not justify a finding that the practice has no goodwill nor that
the community goodwill has no value." ' 1 7 Additionally, in Foster, the
court held that "[t]he value of community goodwill is not necessarily the
specified amount of money that a willing buyer would pay for such
goodwill."'18
As Justice Cooper points out in his dissent in McTiernan,
108. In re Marriage of McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th 1090, 1096 (2005).
109. Id. at 1100 (citing Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 8 Cal. 4th
868, 875 (1994)).
110. Id. at 1101.
111. Id. at 1100.
112. CAL. BuS. & PROF. CODE § 14102 (West 1987).
113. McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1101.
114. See, e.g., Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 251 (1956).
115. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d at 251.
116. In re Marriage of Watts, 171 Cal. App. 3d 366, 372 (1985).
117. Id. at 372.
118. In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 584 (1974).
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marketability is not relevant to the existence of goodwill in divorces, since
in this context goodwill is not a product to be sold in the marketplace, but
is "a portion [of the community value] of the professional practice as a
going concern on the date of the dissolution of the marriage."1 19 Finding
goodwill in marital dissolutions does not require a market value for the
goodwill, unlike the sale of a commercial establishment.1 20  The policy
behind dividing goodwill as community property is that after divorce, "the
practice of the sole practitioner husband will continue, with the same
intangible value as it had during the marriage," and community property
principles dictate that "the wife, by virtue of her position of wife, made to
that value the same contribution as does a wife to any of the husband's
earnings and accumulations during marriage."'121  Therefore, "[s]he is as
much entitled to be recompensed for that contribution as if it were
represented by the increased value of stock in a family business.
122
The McTiernan decision123 requiring that goodwill be marketable is
inconsistent with the majority of case law as well as the policies of
community property, and it is incorrect to conclude that simply because
Mr. McTiernan's career cannot be sold, it cannot have goodwill. 124 Mr.
McTiernan had greater earning capacity based on his reputation as a film
director among studio executives and movie goers.1 25 The Mueller court,
by contrast, had no problem recognizing a valuable intangible property
interest based on excess earning capacity generated from winning the
confidence of patrons.1 26 This property is transferable community property,
pursuant to statute and case law,1 27 because his wife is entitled to be
recompensed for the value that she contributed to his increased earning
capacity by supporting him in his career. Similarly, in the hypothetical,
Wanda has established a practice that is entirely dependent on her personal
skill, and she has secured a consistent flow of clients based on this skill.
Because heightened reputation or skill would be considered a valuable
intangible property interest for a doctor or lawyer, it should also be
considered a valuable property interest for a creative professional like
Wanda, and Henry should be entitled to compensation for his contribution
119. McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1118 (Cooper, J., concurring and dissenting).
120. Id. at 1117-18.
121. Golden v. Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d 401, 405 (1969).
122. Id.
123. McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1101.
124. Id.
125. Combined Respondent's Brief and Cross-Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 16, at
16-19.
126. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d at 251.
127. See Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d at 405.
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to this value.
1. The Right of Publicity and Celebrity Goodwill
The right of publicity also supports the idea that a celebrity's
"goodwill" or reputation is property. This principle recognizes that a
celebrity has a right to exploit his or her likeness for commercial purposes
and financial gain and can prevent others from using the likeness without
permission. 128 Over time, this right has grown into an intangible property
interest, with courts assigning it characteristics of property such as
descendibility. 129  The right of publicity and celebrity goodwill are not
identical principles, but they are comparable principles that have often been
discussed together by commentators.130 The Supreme Court recognized the
close tie between the right of publicity and goodwill in 1977, when it said
that "[t]he rationale for [protecting the right of publicity] is the
straightforward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good
will.' 131 The principles of the right of publicity are relevant in this instance
because they acknowledge the property interest created by a celebrity's
fame and support the idea that people who have established a profession
based on fame or reputation have a valuable property right.
California's right of publicity doctrine is created by common law and
statute. 132 These laws allow a celebrity to bring legal action against another
person who exploits or attempts to exploit the celebrity's name or
likeness. 133  A common law right of publicity action requires that the
celebrity prove: "(1) the defendant's use of the plaintiffs identity; (2) the
appropriation of plaintiffs name or likeness to defendant's advantage,
commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury."
'134
The statutory cause of action differs from common law in that it requires a
"knowing" use of the celebrity's identity, 135 whereas the common law
allows inadvertence or mistake as a defense.136 Despite their differences in
128. David Westfall & David Landau, Publicity Rights as Property Rights, 23 CARDOZO
ARTs & ENT. L.J. 71, 80-89 (2005).
129. Id. at 83.
130. See Rosenson, supra note 96, at 47, 51; Westfall & Landau, supra note 128, at 99-101.
131. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977).
132. Michaels v. Internet Entm't Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 836 (C.D. Cal. 1998)
(citing Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a)
(West 1997)).
133. Michaels, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 836.
134. Laws v. Sony Music Entm't, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing
Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 417 (1983)).
135. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1997).
136. Eastwood, 149 Cal. App. 3d at 417 n.6.
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application, both the common law and statutory cause of action for right of
publicity embody the policy that when a celebrity's likeness has value, and
that likeness is being used by someone other than the celebrity to sell a
product, the celebrity should be compensated for the use.
137
California is the leader in expanding protection for the right of
publicity. 138 First, the Ninth Circuit expanded the right of publicity to
include the protection of a celebrity's voice in Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,
when it upheld the jury verdict awarding singer Tom Waits over two
million dollars in damages after Frito-Lay ran a radio advertisement
featuring a singer mimicking Mr. Waits' voice.1 39 Then, in what has been
referred to as the "ultimate expansion of [the right of publicity] law," 140 the
Ninth Circuit case White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. allowed
Vanna White, the "Wheel of Fortune" game show host, to recover under
the common law right of publicity when defendants used a robot that
resembled Ms. White in an advertisement. This holding expanded the
reach of the right of publicity doctrine beyond simply the name or likeness,
all the way to the vague limits of a celebrity's "identity."
' 4'
Examining the right of publicity cases demonstrates that there are
other ways to define a creative professional or celebrity's goodwill as
"property" without tying it to the existence of a business with tangible
assets. Though the McTiernan majority asserts that Mr. McTiernan's
celebrity goodwill is not an asset that is divisible community property,1
42
other decisions demonstrate that courts have often found that reputation is a
valuable asset when someone is trying to appropriate another person's
identity or reputation without consent. 143  As the New Jersey Superior
Court explained when it made a similar observation in the case of Piscopo
v. Piscopo, "[t]he court cannot countenance the anomaly that would result
if one branch of Chancery vigorously protected plaintiffs person and
business from another's 'unjust enrichment by the theft of [his] goodwill,'
while another branch deprived a spouse from sharing in that very same
protectible interest." 
1 44
137. Westfall & Landau, supra note 128, at 93.
138. Id. at 91.
139. Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1096 (9th Cir. 1992).
140. Judy Lucas, California's Right of Publicity: A Ninth Circuit Favorite, 3 J. LEGAL
ADVOC. & PRAC. 82, 86 (2001).
141. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992).
142. See MeTiernan, 133 Cal. App 4th 1090.
143. See White, 971 F.2d 1395; Waits, 978 F.2d 1093.
144. Piscopo v. Piscopo, 555 A.2d 1190, 1192 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988) (citation
omitted).
CELEBRITY GOODWILL
IV. VALUATION ISSUES
The McTiernan court expressed concern about the "wide
ramifications" of allowing "a person doing business" to have the capacity
to create goodwill, stating that it would create liability "without a
guarant[ee] that the liability would be funded.' '145 The court feared that
since the goodwill would be based on earning capacity, the unpredictability
of earnings could create a liability that potentially could not be funded.
146
Noting also that community property law dictates that "the expectancy of
future earnings may not be considered in determining goodwill," the court
claimed that the "excess earning" method used by the trial court to
calculate goodwill was "not far removed from a prediction about future
,,147earnings. Therefore the court reasoned that injecting the notion of "a
person doing business" into the statute creates an asset that is actually a
prediction of future earnings, which is a violation of California community
property law. 
148
The court is unjustified in its contention that assigning goodwill to an
individual would create liabilities that cannot be funded because of the
unpredictability of earnings. First, whether goodwill is assigned to a film
director, a lawyer, or a doctor, its valuation is always somewhat speculative
and carries with it some risk. 149 In Mueller, when presented with a wide
range of evidence regarding the goodwill value of the husband's solo
practice, the trial court conceded that the value was "an estimate only," but
nonetheless proceeded to apply a variant of the excess earnings approach to
assign the practice a goodwill value of $25,000.150 As an accounting expert
testified in the Foster case regarding valuing goodwill, it is "always just
somebody's opinion.""' 1 Despite this, as one commentator noted, "if it
does exist, a value should be placed on it.' 152  California courts have
repeatedly placed a value on professional goodwill, regardless of the
unpredictability of such a value. 153 Additionally, as the dissenting opinion
in the McTiernan case points out, valuations of goodwill "take into account
145. In re Marriage of McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th 1090, 1099 (2005).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1099 n.7.
148. Id. at 1099.
149. Christopher A. Tiso, Present Positions on Professional Goodwill: More Focus or
Simply More Hocus Pocus?, 20 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 51, 68 (2006).
150. Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 252 (1956).
151. In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 580-81 (1974).
152. Tiso, supra note 149, at 68.
153. See In re Marriage of Ackerman, 146 Cal. App. 4th 191 (2006); Foster, 42 Cal. App.
3d 577; Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245.
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the individual or other business's apparent prospects, negative as well as
positive.' ' 154 The factors that a court may look to in valuing goodwill are
varied, and include such considerations as "the amount of patronage" and
"the personality of the parties engaged in business."' 5 5  Each case is
determined on its own facts, with no rigid rules for determination of how to
value the goodwill. 56 The court will look for a method which accounts for
all the circumstances and will attempt to determine a goodwill value that is
as realistic as possible. The fact that valuing goodwill based on earnings is
merely an educated estimate has not stopped courts from doing so for other
professionals, 157 so it certainly should not prevent a professional film
director's goodwill from being valued.
One approach that is commonly used for valuing goodwill is the
excess earnings method. This method, also known as the "capitalized
excess earnings method," requires taking the average net income of the
professional, subtracting the annual salary of an average practitioner or
employee with like experience, and capitalizing the difference over a
period of years. 5 8 The McTiernan court disagreed with the lower court's
use of the excess earnings method for valuing Mr. McTiernan's goodwill,
saying the method was "not far removed from a prediction about future
earnings," which is not allowed under community property principals.
59
However, California courts have consistently used the excess earnings
approach as a primary method of valuing a professional's goodwill,'
60
which leads one to believe that the McTiernan court's assessment of the
method is inaccurate. Even if the end result of the method does forecast
future earnings, this speculation is necessary to determine goodwill itself,
which is based on the "expectation of continued public patronage. The
excess earnings approach does not take speculated future earnings into
account when determining goodwill, but instead takes into account prior
earnings, with consideration toward the expectancy that the profession or
business will continue.' 
62
154. McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1117 n.2 (2005) (Cooper, P.J., concurring and
dissenting).
155. Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d at 583 (affirming the trial court's use of these factors to assign
husband's solo medical practice a goodwill value of $27,000).
156. People ex rel. Dep't of Trans. v. Muller, 36 Cal. 3d 263, 271 n.7 (1984).
157. See In re Marriage of Watts, 171 Cal. App. 3d 366 (1985).
158. McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1095 n.1.
159. Id. at 1099 n.7.
160. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Rosen, 105 Cal. App. 4th 808 (2002); Watts, 171 Cal. App.
3d 366; Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245.
161. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 14100 (West 1987).
162. See Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d at 581 (affirming the trial court's use of the excess
CELEBRITY GOODWILL
Valuing goodwill is often considered problematic, and California
courts have attempted to strike a balance between not tampering with the
professional's future earnings and not depriving the spouse of his or her
share of goodwill that was created during the marriage. 63 In Foster, the
court recited the importance of choosing a valuation method that does not
require a prediction about future income.' 64 The court said that because
community property is only that which is acquired during the marriage,
"the value of the goodwill must exist at the time of the dissolution and that
value must be established without dependence on the potential or
continuing net income of the professional spouse."'' 65 The Foster court
noted that the valuation of goodwill is not determined by a bright line rule,
but instead by taking into account all the facts and circumstances on a case-
by-case basis. 66  The court held that the proper manner for valuing
community goodwill is by "any legitimate method" which does not account
for "the post-marital efforts of either spouse," but which "measures its
present value by taking into account some past result.' 67 The excess
earnings method clearly met these requirements. Consequently, the Foster
decision undermines the McTiernan court's claim that the excess earnings
method fails the requirement that valuation of goodwill not include
predictions of future earnings.
The hypothetical scenario of Henry and Wanda can serve as a
rudimentary example of how an accountant may determine Wanda's
goodwill value upon their divorce using the excess earnings method. The
accountant would first take Wanda's average pre-tax annual net earnings at
the time of divorce, subtract a "fair return" on the net tangible assets, and
then subtract the salary of an average designer with similar
qualifications.' 68 So, if $750,000 is Wanda's average pre-tax income after
deducting the fair return, and $500,000 is the salary of the average
designer, the difference would be $250,000. The accountant would then
capitalize this amount over a number of years.' 69  This is done by
multiplying the amount by a factor that represents a period of years,
discounted to reflect present value of the excess earnings. 70 If it is
earnings method).
163. Smith, supra note 18, at 249.
164. See Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d at 584.
165. Id. at 582.
166. Id. at 583-84.
167. Id. at 584-85.
168. McTiernan, 133 Cal. App. 4th at 1095 n.1.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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capitalized over a period of four years, we arrive at a value of one million
dollars. Therefore, one million dollars would be placed in Henry and
Wanda's community property pot as Wanda's goodwill, and it would be
divided equally between them. It is clear that this method does not entail a
prediction about any increased earnings in the future. Rather, it calculates
Wanda's enhanced earning capacity at the time of the divorce and projects
that amount a few years into the future, without attempting to account for
any increases over those years.
Reading "a person doing business" into the goodwill statute would
not have the effect on valuation of goodwill that the McTiernan court
claims. The court's fear of creating liabilities that cannot be paid is no
greater in the case of a film director than it is in the case of any sole
practitioner-assigning value to the expected continued public patronage of
any professional is speculative and risky. Despite this risk, there are people
who make their living "appraising celebrity 'brand value' during divorce
litigation," '' which indicates that value does exist there. To deny the
goodwill value of a celebrity or creative professional, who carries the same
intangible asset of "what they can earn based simply on who they are"' 72 as
any established doctor or lawyer, would be unfair. The accepted methods
for valuing goodwill in professional practices founded on personal skill and
reputation have been upheld as consistent with community property laws.
The fact that someone is a film director, rather than an attorney or doctor,
does not change the effect that the excess earnings method has on the
valuation of his or her goodwill.
V. CELEBRITY GOODWILL IN NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY
Currently, New Jersey and New York are the only states that
recognize "celebrity goodwill" as a divisible asset at divorce.'73 New York
and New Jersey treat the marital status of property differently than
California because they follow the "equitable distribution" approach,
174
whereas California subscribes to the community property approach.
However, the difference is irrelevant here. The reasoning underlying
171. Leigh Gallagher, Face Value, FORBES, July 3, 2003,
http://www.forbes.com/2003/07/03/cz-lg_0703appraisers.html.
172. Id.
173. Cutler & Bogan, supra note 13, at 20.
174. See McGowan v. McGowan, 518 N.Y.S.2d 346, 348 (App. Div. 1987) (holding that
"[t]he function of equitable distribution is to recognize that when a marriage ends, each of the
spouses, based on the totality of the contributions made to it, has a stake in and right to a share of
the marital assets accumulated while it endured, not because that share is needed, but because
those assets represent the capital product of what was essentially a partnership entity").
CELEBRITY GOODWILL
California's goodwill law is "almost identical to" the reasoning found in
the most current New Jersey and New York cases,' 75 which makes it
difficult to understand the McTiernan decision preventing celebrity
goodwill from existing in California.
A. New York Recognizes "Enhanced Earning Capacity" as Marital
Property
New York's present recognition of celebrity goodwill sprung from the
holding in O'Brien v. O'Brien, which recognized a professional license as
marital property subject to distribution at divorce.176 However, the doctrine
evolved and the state eventually recognized that enhanced earning capacity
created during marriage has value that should be distributed upon
divorce. 77  The first time New York recognized a form of celebrity
goodwill based on enhanced earning capacity was in 1988 when the
Supreme Court held in Golub v. Golub that "the skills of an artisan, actor,
professional athlete or any person whose expertise in his or her career has
enabled him or her to become an exceptional wage earner should be valued
as marital property subject to equitable distribution.' ' 78 In Golub, the wife
was an actress and model and the husband was an attorney who managed
the couple's home and finances while supporting his wife in advancing her
career.' 79 The husband contended that the increased value of his wife's
career was marital property that should be divided at divorce, and the court
agreed. 80 The Golub court proclaimed that the O'Brien holding regarding
licenses as marital property was based on the value of the "enhanced
earning capacity that the license affords the holder" and therefore should be
extended beyond licenses to "any other special skill that generates
substantial income.,"' The court reasoned that "[w]hen a person's
expertise in a field has allowed him or her to be an exceptional wage
earner, this generates a value similar to that of the goodwill of a
business. ' 2 Therefore, even though the wife's "celebrity status is neither
'professional' nor a 'license,' its increase in value is marital property,
despite the difficulties presented in valuing such property."'
' 83
175. Rosenson, supra note 96, at 49.
176. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 713 (N.Y. 1985).
177. See Golub v. Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d 946, 950 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 947-48.
180. Id. at 949-50.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 950.
183. Golub v. Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d 946, 950 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (citation omitted).
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Elkus v. Elkus' 84 solidified New York's position on the issue, as it
linked the enhanced earning capacity found in past cases to the concept of
"celebrity goodwill," as found by New Jersey's Piscopo v. Piscopo a few
years earlier. 185 The Elkus divorce case involved a wife whose career as an
opera singer escalated from performing minor roles to earning praise as a
famous international performer, all during the course of the marriage.
186
The court held that "to the extent the [husband's] contributions and efforts
led to an increase in the value of the [wife's] career, this appreciation was a
product of the marital partnership, and, therefore, marital property subject
to equitable distribution."'1 87 The court further severed the tie the O'Brien
case had created between enhanced earning capacity and professional
licenses, stating that limiting marital property to licensed professions
"would only serve to discriminate against the spouses of those engaged in
other areas of employment."'1 88 The Elkus court agreed with the idea that
goodwill can be generated by a person who has a "particular and
uncommon aptitude" for some specialized skill. 189 Therefore, the court
held that "the enhanced skills of an artist such as the plaintiff, albeit
growing from an innate talent, which have enabled her to become an
exceptional earner, may be valued as marital property subject to equitable
distribution."'1 90
The main argument against California following in the footsteps of
New York is that where New York recognizes professional degrees and
licenses as marital property, California does not consider them community
property. 191 Yet it is apparent from the main New York cases on the
subject that celebrity goodwill as a marital asset is not closely tied to the
recognition of professional licenses as marital property. Instead, New York
has recognized that it is not the license or degree which has value, but the
enhanced earning capacity that one spouse generates because they have the
special skill which the license affirms. 192 In Golub, the court explicitly
expanded the reach of O'Brien beyond professional licenses and said that
all income-generating assets should be considered in determining the value
of marital property, including "any other special skill that generates
184. Elkus v. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901 (App. Div. 1991).
185. Id. at 904 (citing Piscopo v. Piscopo, 555 A.2d 1190 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Ch. Div.
1988)).
186. Id. at 901-02.
187. Id. at 901.
188. Id. at 903.
189. Id. at 904 (citing Piscopo, 555 A.2d 1190).
190. Elkus v. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904 (App. Div. 1991).
191. Rosenson, supra note 96, at 52.
192. See Golub, 527 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
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substantial income." 193 Similarly, California recognized in Mueller that
when a person has a reputation or skill in a specific profession, he or she
generates the intangible property value of goodwill which, in the divorce
context, is divisible community property.194 Both California and New York
recognize the importance of compensating the spouse who supports another
spouse in the pursuit of the career which generates this value. 195 New York
courts dictate that "an increase in the value of separate property of one
spouse, occurring during the marriage... which is due in part to the
indirect contributions or efforts of the other spouse as homemaker and
parent, should be considered marital property."' 96 Similarly, California
courts state that "if goodwill exists at the time of divorce, some part of it
must be attributable to the resources the marriage put into its
development."'
' 97
Although not binding on California, New York's celebrity goodwill
law is founded on similar principles and serves as an example to California
courts. It demonstrates how a traditional understanding of goodwill can
develop into a more modem understanding that encompasses less
traditional professions. California must recognize what New York already
has-by limiting the existence of goodwill to professionals engaged in
more traditional professions, the law isolates those people who support
their spouses' less traditional careers, causing an imbalanced and unfair
result. 198
B. New Jersey Recognizes "Celebrity Goodwill" as a Derivative of
"Professional Goodwill"
The evolution of celebrity goodwill in New Jersey began with the
recognition of professional goodwill in the case of Dugan v. Dugan, when
the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that a husband's solo law practice
could generate goodwill, and that goodwill is subject to equitable
distribution upon divorce. 199 The court defined goodwill as "essentially
reputation that will probably generate future business '200 and discussed the
development of the doctrine with regards to businesses. 2°  However the
193. Id.
194. Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 249-52 (1956).
195. See Price v. Price, 503 N.E.2d 684, 685 (N.Y. 1986); Smith, supra note 18, at 249.
196. Price, 503 N.E.2d at 685.
197. Smith, supra note 18, at 249.
198. See Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 903.
199. Dugan v. Dugan, 457 A.2d 1, 6 (N.J. 1983).
200. Id. at 3.
201. Id. at 3-6.
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court expanded the reach of goodwill beyond businesses to encompass
individual professionals.20 2 It stated that in solo professional practices,
goodwill is created when "future earning capacity has been enhanced
because reputation leads to probable future patronage from existing and
potential clients., 20 3 The court reasoned that it would be inequitable to
ignore the non-attorney spouse contributions to the development of the
"economic resource" that is the attorney spouse's goodwill. 20 4
New Jersey's professional goodwill doctrine engendered celebrity
goodwill in 1989 with the Piscopo v. Piscopo decision.20 5 First, the trial
court was called upon to decide whether the husband (comedian Joe
Piscopo) had "celebrity goodwill" similar to the "professional goodwill"
already established in New Jersey.206 The court held that he did have
celebrity goodwill, which it defined as "a distinct asset susceptible of
evaluation which is distributable if acquired during the marriage. 20 7 The
court cited Dugan, which said that reputation is the "comerstone" of the
legally protectible interest that is goodwill.20 8 The Piscopo court explained
that very few "of those who choose professional or entertainment
careers... have the talent to generate above-average earnings," but these
earnings, based on a "particular and uncommon aptitude for some
specialized discipline whether law, medicine or entertainment"20 9 are
measurable goodwill subject to equitable distribution at divorce.210
Piscopo appealed the trial court's decision, and although he conceded
that celebrity goodwill is a marital asset, he argued that his reputation
should not be considered goodwill because the earnings based on his
reputation were "possible" instead of "probable" and were thus
unpredictable and difficult to value. 21' The appellate court disagreed with
Piscopo and affirmed the trial court's decision that his celebrity goodwill
was a distributable marital asset.212 The court reasoned that "business
goodwill" exists even if the business is entirely dependent upon the skill of
one person and has no market value 213 and that it could be valued based on
202. Id. at 6.
203. Id. at 5-6.
204. Id. at 6.
205. Piscopo v. Piscopo, 557 A.2d 1040 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989).
206. Piscopo v. Piscopo, 555 A.2d 1190, 1191 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988).
207. Id. at 1193.
208. Id. at 1191 (citing Dugan, 457 A.2d at 6).
209. Id. at 1192.
210. Id. at 1193.
211. Piscopo, 557 A.2d at 1040, 1042.
212. Id. at 1043.
213. Id. at 1041.
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"past earning capacity and the probability that such past earnings will
,,214continue. Therefore, even though celebrity goodwill is difficult to
value, the court asserted that the "difficulty would not affect its
includability in the marital estate.,
215
New Jersey's development of celebrity goodwill was similar to the
progression of California goodwill up until the decision in McTiernan. In
New Jersey, Dugan expanded the understanding of goodwill as something
generated not only by a typical "business" but also by an individual
practitioner based on reputation.2 16 Similarly in California, Mueller and its
progeny expanded the understanding of goodwill, establishing that it does
not require the existence of a commercial or trade enterprise, but can be
generated by an individual professional's practice founded on personal skill
and reputation.217 However, New Jersey took the next logical step,
recognizing that goodwill in an individual practice is not premised only on
the physical assets of a business but also on the intangible assets of a
person's "particular and uncommon aptitude for some specialized
discipline whether law, medicine or entertainment., 218 This aptitude is
reflected by an earning capacity that exceeds that person's peers.2 19 New
Jersey grounded the decision to expand goodwill on the policy that "[i]f
one spouse has sacrificed and assisted the other in an effort to increase that
other spouse's earning capacity, it should make no difference what shape or
form that asset takes so long as it in fact results in an increase [sic] earning
capacity. ' '22°  New Jersey courts therefore expanded the concept of
goodwill beyond the original understanding of it as attached to a business
enterprise and allowed it to apply to a natural person practicing a
profession with no ties to any commercial enterprise.
The McTiernan court had an opportunity to expand the understanding
of goodwill for California but instead narrowed the concept to ensure that
goodwill was only generated by professionals practicing in a commercial or
trade enterprise. This decision overlooked the principle of California
community property law which dictates that a spouse has contributed to the
increased earning capacity of the other spouse generated during marriage,
214. Id. at 1042 (citing Dugan, 457 A.2d 1).
215. Id. at 1042.
216. Dugan, 457 A.2d at 6.
217. See Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 250-51 (1956); see also In re Marriage
of Watts, 171 Cal. App. 3d 366 (1985); In re Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577 (1974);
Golden v. Golden, 270 Cal. App. 2d 401 (1969).
218. Piscopo, 555 A.2d at 1192.
219. Id.
220. Piscopo, 557 A.2d at 1042.
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simply because of his or her position as the supporting spouse. 22 1 Because
of McTiernan, the policy of compensating a supporting spouse for
contributing to the other spouse's increased earning capacity is defeated
when the professional spouse's career is creative and is not tied to a
commercial enterprise.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, celebrity goodwill is not only
about celebrities. It is about value based on an established reputation,
which is manifested in an earning capacity that surpasses that of
222competitors. To say that a professional person cannot generate this value
because his or her career exists apart from a commercial establishment
makes no sense, because the existence or absence of a commercial
establishment should have no effect on that person's ability to earn more
than his or her competitors. A successful career is just that, no matter what
form it comes in. In the divorce context, the limitation of goodwill
prevents the spouse of a creative professional from being compensated for
the contribution he or she made to the successful career of the other spouse,
while allowing the spouse of a doctor or lawyer to be compensated simply
because those professions attach to a commercial enterprise. This result
not only deviates from the evolved California goodwill doctrine, but it is
also inconsistent.with generally accepted principles of community property.
In 2005, California seemed to be progressing toward a broader
understanding of goodwill in divorce proceedings, based largely on the
community property policy of compensating the spouse who invested in the
goodwill by supporting the spouse who earned the goodwill. 223  This
progression was cut short by the McTiernan decision, which presented a
holding inconsistent with California's established rules and policies on
goodwill, as can be seen by the foregoing analysis of the court's rationales.
The result is confusing and begs the question as to whether a slightly
different fact pattern would have precipitated a different holding. Here,
Ms. Dubrow was obviously a capable career woman who earned a
substantial income before marrying her husband and also worked alongside
him as a producing partner during their marriage. But what would the
result have been if she had no career of her own? Would the court have
been able to deny her any share of her husband's substantial earning
capacity with a straight face if she was a "housewife" without any career
221. Golden, 270 Cal. App. at 405.
222. See Mueller v. Mueller, 144 Cal. App. 2d 245, 250-52 (1956).
223. See Golden, 270 Cal. App. at 405.
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prospects? Would the court have reached the same decision if Wanda from
the hypothetical was in Mr. McTiernan's position in the courtroom, and the
issue concerned extending goodwill to an ordinary creative professional
instead of a celebrity film director? These questions are important. The
McTiernan decision represents an alarming departure from the
development of the law in this area. Even more alarming is the potential
impact the court's decision not to recognize "celebrity goodwill" will have
on the spouses of creative and unorthodox professionals in California.
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